

Message Text

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SUBJECT: US STATEMENT FOR CCD MEETING JULY 16

DISTO

FOLLOWING IS CLEARED STATEMENT FOR CCD MEETING OF JULY 16:

1. IN MY STATEMENT AT THE OPENING MEETING OF THIS SESSION,
I REFERRED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS THEN IN PROGRESS BETWEEN
LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AND SAID
THAT I HOPED TO BE ABLE TO REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN
TO THAT SUBJECT TODAY AND REVIEW BRIEFLY THE THREE PRIN-
CIPAL DOCUMENTS IN THE ARMS CONTROL AREA SIGNED AT THE
MOSCOW SUMMIT: THE PROTOCOL TO THE 1972 US-SOVIET TREATY

ON ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS PLACING FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON ABM DEPLOYMENT; THE JOINT STATEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE; AND THE TREATY AND PROTOCOL ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS. THESE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN TABLED TODAY AS JOINT US-SOVIET CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS.

2. SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER HAS NOTED THAT ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE SUMMIT WAS TO DEAL WITH WHAT HE CALLED "THE MOST COMPLEX AND IN MANY RESPECTS THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM OF THE MODERN PERIOD, WHICH IS THE CONTROL

OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE". THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THE CRITICAL ROLE PLAYED BY TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DRIVING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING FIRM CONTROL OVER THESE DEVELOPMENTS. HE DEPLORED ARMS COMPETITION NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS MILITARY CONSEQUENCES, BUT "ALSO BECAUSE THE JUSTIFICATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE ON EITHER SIDE TO SUSTAIN SUCH AN EFFORT, MIGHT, IN TIME, BECOME INCOMPATIBLE WITH A POLICY OF RELAXATION OF TENSIONS AND MIGHT, IN THEMSELVES, BE A FACTOR INTRODUCING CONFRONTATION". ACCORDINGLY, ONE TASK AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT WAS TO SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE MEANS OF CONTROLLING THE DIRECTION OF RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE STRATEGIC AREA, TO ENSURE THAT THESE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WHILE THE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN MOSCOW ARE THE PRODUCT OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN TWO STATES, THEY ARE ALSO A CONTRIBUTION TO THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN WHICH WE ARE ALL ENGAGED, AND THEY ARE DIRECTED AT THE SAME WIDELY-SHARED GOALS: THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, THE FURTHER RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, AND THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

3. THE FIRST OF THESE AGREEMENTS, THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE
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SYSTEMS, RESTRICTS THE DEPLOYMENT OF ABM SYSTEMS TO A SINGLE SITE, INSTEAD OF TO TWO SEPARATE DEPLOYMENT AREAS -- ONE DEFENDING AN ICBM FIELD AND THE OTHER DEFENDING THE CAPITAL CITY -- AS WAS PERMITTED IN THE 1972 TREATY. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR SOME FLEXIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE SINGLE AREA WHICH CAN NOW BE DEFENDED, THE PROTOCOL GIVES EACH SIDE AN OPPORTUNITY ONCE, UNDER CONDITIONS SPECIFIED IN THE PROTOCOL, TO CHANGE ITS ORIGINAL DECISION REGARDING ITS DEPLOYMENT AREA.

4. WITH RESPECT TO ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE, THE TWO SIDES HAVE JOINTLY DECLARED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEASURES POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME THE DANGERS OF THE USE

OF ENVIRONMENT MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. ACCORDINGLY, SOVIET AND US REPRESENTATIVES WILL MEET THIS YEAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPLORING THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSING WHAT STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF THE HOSTILE USE OF THESE TECHNIQUES.

5. THE THIRD ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS ABOVE A

THRESHOLD OF 150 KILOTONS, IS, I AM SURE, THE ONE IN WHICH MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE HAVE THE GREATEST INTEREST. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROSPECT OF EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF VERIFYING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION DECIDED TO TAKE THIS SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD THE OBJECTIVE OF A CTB.

6. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE HAVE RECOMMENDED SUCH A PARTIAL AND INTERMEDIATE APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF FURTHER RESTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR TESTING, AND A UN RESOLUTION IN 1971 CALLED ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING COUNTRIES "TO UNDERTAKE UNILATERAL OR NEGOTIATED MEASURES OF RESTRAINT THAT WOULD SUSPEND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTING OR LIMIT OR REDUCE THE SIZE AND NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS, PENDING THE EARLY ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS BY ALL STATES" (A/2828 C, XXVI). MOST RECENTLY, UNCLASSIFIED

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IN 1972, THE DELEGATION OF JAPAN PROPOSED A THRESHOLD TEST BAN WHICH INITIALLY WOULD HAVE HAD THE EFFECT OF PROHIBITING TESTING IN HARD ROCK ABOVE APPROXIMATELY 150 KILOTONS.

7. THE TREATY SIGNED AT MOSCOW PROHIBITS UNDERGROUND TESTING ABOVE A THRESHOLD YIELD OF 150 KILOTONS, EFFECTIVE MARCH 31, 1976. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS LIMITATION WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT MODERATING EFFECT ON THE US-SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS COMPETITION. IT WILL HELP TO PRECLUDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW GENERATIONS OF HIGH-YIELD WARHEAD DESIGNS COMPATIBLE WITH MODERN DELIVERY SYSTEMS BY BOTH SIDES. BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED, SUCH WARHEADS CANNOT WITH CONFIDENCE BE PUT INTO WEAPONS STOCKPILES WITHOUT TESTING. THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE LIMITATION WILL PERMIT FURTHER DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY AND IT WILL ALSO PERMIT NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT TO REGULATE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, SUBJECTS I WILL DISCUSS IN MORE DETAIL IN A MOMENT.

8. THE TREATY ALSO DECLARES THE INTENTION OF BOTH PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE WITH A VIEW TOWARD ACHIEVING A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE CESSATION OF ALL UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS. THIS PROVISION, TOGETHER WITH THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH RECALLING THE COMMITMENT UNDERTAKEN BY PARTIES TO THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963, REAFFIRMS OUR COMMITMENT TO AN ADEQUATELY VERIFIED COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN.

9. THE TREATY AND ITS PROTOCOL PROVIDE FOR VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, SUPPLEMENTED BY THE RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF DATA REGARDING THE LOCATION AND DETAILED GEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAPONS TEST AREAS, AND, FOR CALIBRATION PURPOSES, EXCHANGE OF DATA ON THE YIELDS OF TWO TESTS CONDUCTED IN EACH GEOPHYSICALLY DISTINCT TEST AREA. THIS WILL GIVE EACH PARTY SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE IN ITS ABILITY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE BY THE OTHER, AND, BY SO DOING, WILL FURTHER BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND TRUST.

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10. THE TREATY PROVIDES THAT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WILL BE COVERED BY A SEPARATE AGREEMENT, TO BE NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED BY THE PARTIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CONCLUSION OF THIS AGREEMENT IS INTEGRALLY RELATED TO THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATY, NAMELY, TO PREVENT MILITARY TESTING AT YIELDS GREATER THAN 150 KILOTONS. THE TREATMENT OF PNE'S IN THE TREATY AND ITS PROTOCOL IS, OF COURSE, FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

11. BOTH PARTIES RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFYING THAT ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES DO NOT SERVE WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. THEY HAVE ALREADY REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING IN PRINCIPLE ON SOME OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ADEQUATELY VERIFYING THAT ANY PNE'S ARE NOT WEAPON TESTS, INCLUDING PRIOR NOTIFICATION, PRECISE DEFINITION OF TIME AND PLACE, AND THE PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS. IT WILL, OF COURSE, BE NECESSARY TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION MEASURES. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PNE AGREEMENT REFERRED TO IN THE PRESENT TREATY AND PROTOCOL BETWEEN TWO NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WOULD NOT BE APPLICABLE TO THE PROBLEM POSED BY A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE'S DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. IT IS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE TO DEVELOP A CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WITHOUT, IN THE PROCESS, ACQUIRING A DEVICE WHICH COULD BE USED AS A NUCLEAR WEAPON.

12. THE DURATION OF THE TREATY IS SET AT FIVE YEARS, SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC RENEWAL UNLESS AN AGREEMENT FURTHER IMPLEMENTING THE OBJECTIVE OF COMPLETE CESSATION OF

UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED OR UNLESS EITHER PARTY NOTIFIES THE OTHER OF ITS DECISION TO TERMINATE THE TREATY. THE TREATY ALSO PROVIDES FOR CONSULTATION, POSSIBLE AMENDMENT, WITHDRAWAL, AND REGISTRATION OF THE TREATY PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 102 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

13. FINALLY, I WISH TO DIRECT THE ATTENTION OF THE COMMITTEE TO TWO ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF THE JOINT US-UNCLASSIFIED

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SOVIET COMMUNIQUE. THE US AND USSR EMPHASIZED THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, REAFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO OBSERVE THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THAT TREATY, INCLUDING ARTICLE VI, AND STATED THAT THEY FAVORED INCREASING THE TREATY'S EFFECTIVENESS.

14. WITH RESPECT TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE US AND THE USSR REAFFIRMED THEIR INTEREST IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE SUCH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AS CW FROM THE ARSENALS OF STATES. DESIRING TO CONTRIBUTE TO EARLY PROGRESS IN THAT DIRECTION, THEY AGREED TO CONSIDER A JOINT INITIATIVE IN THIS COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE CONCLUSION, AS A FIRST STEP, OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION DEALING WITH THE MOST DANGEROUS, LETHAL MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE. FOR ITS PART, THE US WILL WORK SERIOUSLY TO FULFILL THIS STATEMENT OF JOINT PURPOSE. MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT CONCLUDES MY REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS AT THE SUMMIT.

15. I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO TURN TO OUR INFORMAL MEETING ON CW WHICH BEGINS TOMORROW. THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS LOOKING FORWARD TO THIS MEETING AND WELCOMES THE PARTICIPATION OF SO MANY DISTINGUISHED EXPERTS. PAST MEETINGS SUCH AS THIS HAVE ESTABLISHED A SOLID RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT IN CLARIFYING SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THIS MEETING WILL HELP MOVE US CLOSER TO OUR OBJECTIVE OF EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND WILL, IN PARTICULAR, SHED FURTHER LIGHT ON THE CLOSELY RELATED AND DIFFICULT QUESTIONS OF SCOPE AND VERIFICATION.

16. THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS TODAY SUBMITTING THREE WORKING PAPERS ON CW. THE FIRST OF THESE DISCUSSES THE SUGGESTION THAT A TOXICITY CRITERION MIGHT HELP TO DEFINE THE AGENTS TO BE PROHIBITED. OUR SECOND PAPER DEALS WITH THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING A CONTROL SYSTEM TO PREVENT DIVERSION OF PHOSPHORUS TO NERVE AGENT PRODUCTION. THE THIRD PAPER IS ON THE SUBJECT OF CHEMICAL AGENT DESTRUCTION AND DISCUSSES POSSIBLE METHODS OF VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION PROCESS BASED ON ACTUAL DISPOSAL PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY THE U.S. ARMY.

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17. AT THE EXPERTS' MEETING, THE US DELEGATION WILL TRY
TO PROVIDE A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION AND TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE PAPERS. WE HOPE THAT IN THIS
WAY WE WILL BE ABLE TO ASSIST THE COMMITTEE IN ARRIVING
AT SOUND JUDGMENTS ABOUT EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS. KISSINGER

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